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SPECIAL STATE STANDING IS ENVIRONMENTAL:
CLARIFYING MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
DOROTHEA ALLOCCA*
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of
quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all
the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as
to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests
and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.1
INTRODUCTION
When the Court granted states “special solicitude in [its] standing
analysis” in Massachusetts v. EPA, it left lower courts with more questions
than answers.2 While legal scholars continue to debate these questions
thirteen years later,3 the practical impacts of Massachusetts v. EPA are
coming into focus.4 Today states are suing the federal government, often in
multistate coalitions, to enforce or challenge federal administrative poli-
cies.5 This intergovernmental, public-law litigation increased dramatically
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; BA Environmental Studies, Davidson
College, 2018. Thank you to my family, classmates, and professors for their support and
inspiration during this process. I would also like to thank the Environmental Law and
Policy Review for the opportunity to share my work and for their diligent efforts on this
Note and Volume 45.
1 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
2 Id. at 520; see Tara L. Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL
L. REV. 851, 853–54 (2016) (discussing the varying reactions to Massachusetts in the
lower courts).
3 Tara L. Grove, Foreword: Some Puzzles of State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAMEL.REV. 1883,
1883 (2019) (noting that “there seem to be as many questions as answers” about when
states should have standing to sue the United States).
4 See discussion infra Part II.
5 Paul Nolette, Multistate Litigation Database, ATTORNEYSGENERAL.ORG, https://attorneys
general.org/multistate-lawsuits-vs-the-federal-government/list-of-lawsuits-1980-present/
[https://perma.cc/M2L8-JCME] (last updated Sept. 6, 2020) (providing a searchable tool
allowing site visitors to filter and search litigation brought by states from 1980 to
present); see also Attorney General Actions, N.Y.U.: STATE ENERGY & ENV’T IMPACT CTR.
[hereinafter N.Y.U.], https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/ag-actions?field_states
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during the Obama administration and has further skyrocketed since
January 2017.6 States do not exclusively rely upon special state solicitude
in suing the federal government.7 However, this lowered procedural bar is
likely a contributing factor to the dramatic rise in state-initiated litigation.8
The Trump administration’s regulatory “rollback” efforts are also
inspiring public-law litigation. These rollbacks are arguably more pro-
nounced than the characteristic “ebb and flow” of environmental policy
since the 1970s.9 The administration is hollowing out existing environ-
mental and climate policies, increasing atmospheric pollutants like carbon
dioxide, methane, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and particulate matter.10
Instead of merely slowing progress on clean energy development and
emissions reductions, the administration’s rollbacks are reversing de-
cades of environmental policy development and are pushing the globe
toward climate catastrophe.11
The Trump administration’s rollbacks include stays and repeals
of dozens of environmental rules. These rules affect national air quality,
water quality, endangered species, automobile emissions, and coal-fired
_target_id=All&field_agency_target_id=All&field_issue_target_id=All&field_document
_type_target_id=1721&field_action_type_target_id=1729 [https://perma.cc/FZZ2 -4EQ3]
(last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (providing a database of actions taken by state attorneys
general “working to advance clean energy, climate and environmental laws and policies”
since 2017).
6 See Nolette, supra note 5; see also N.Y.U., supra note 5.
7 Depending on the injury alleged, states can join plaintiffs whose injuries meet the
regular Article III standing requirements or intervene in litigation initiated by other
groups. See generally Nolette, supra note 5.
8 Grove, supra note 3, at 1884 (citing Note, An Abdication Approach to State Standing,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1309 (2019) (attributing the rise in intergovernmental litigation
to the Massachusetts v. EPA decision). Other factors may include increased political polari-
zation and political motivations of state attorneys general. See discussion infra Part II.
9 Leif Fredrickson et al., History of US Presidential Assaults on Modern Environmental
Health Protection, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S95, S95 (2018) (arguing Trump’s attacks on
environmental regulation could be more impactful than that of Ronald Reagan and George
W. Bush). But see David M. Konisky & Neal D. Woods, Environmental Federalism and
the Trump Presidency: A Preliminary Assessment, 48 PUBLIUS 345, 365 (2018) (arguing that
even the “severe” transition from President Obama to Trump reflects environmental
policy’s historic ebb and flow).
10 N.Y.U.: STATE ENERGY & ENV’T IMPACT CTR., CLIMATE & HEALTH SHOWDOWN IN THE
COURTS: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT, 4–6 (2019) [hereinafter STATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT], available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/de
fault/files/climate-and-health-showdown-in-the-courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX8A-5TG4]
(estimating that Trump’s actions will result in 209 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
to be emitted into the atmosphere that would otherwise be avoided by existing policies).
11 Id. at 5 (“The Trump administration’s actions amount to a virtual surrender to climate
change.”).
2020] SPECIAL STATE STANDING IS ENVIRONMENTAL 195
power plants.12 Keeping with its stated goals, the administration is success-
fully slowing implementation of, reversing, and replacing many Obama-
era climate policies like the Clean Power Plan.13 But these changes have
not gone unchallenged.
Over a dozen states, primarily led by California, New York, and
Massachusetts, are challenging these deregulatory efforts, creating multi-
state coalitions with other interested states.14 State attorneys general are
leading this litigation charge.15 Historically, attorneys general have been
empowered to sue on behalf of their citizens as parens patriae or “parent
of his or her country.”16 However, the Court’s decision in Massachusetts
v. Mellon limited states in this representative capacity.17 Following that
decision, states remained empowered to sue to protect their own inter-
ests, like their property and the enforcement of their own laws.18 Some
argue that attorneys general are uniquely situated as popularly account-
able officials to initiate litigation against the federal government.19 This
is because intergovernmental state public-law litigation can serve as a
checking function for the federal executive.20 For example, the Court’s grant
of special state solicitude in Massachusetts v. EPA relies on this princi-
ple, namely that states can sue the federal government in their capacity
as a quasi-sovereign.21 In that case, the court held that the state had
established standing to challenge how EPA was enforcing the Clean Air
12 See DAVID J.HAYES ET AL.,N.Y.U.STATE ENERGY &ENV’T IMPACT CTR.,300 AND COUNT-
ING: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL LEAD THE FIGHT FOR HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
2 (2019), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/300%20and%20Counting%20-%20
State%20Impact%20Center.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR7P-TXHE].
13 Maegan Vazquez, Trump’s Dismantling of Environmental Regulations Unwinds 50
Years of Protections, CNN (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/25/politics/trump
-environmental-rollbacks-list/index.html [https://perma.cc/NQF3-V5SQ].
14 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT, supra note 10.
15 See id.
16 Parens Patriae, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/parens-patriae-term.html
[https://perma.cc/B3Z8-VF9U] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020); see Grove, supra note 2, at 863.
17 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923) (denying state standing to enforce
the rights of citizens because suffering “in some indefinite way in common with people
generally” was not an adequate basis for the courts to intervene via judicial review).
18 See discussion infra Part III.
19 Ernest A. Young, State Standing and Cooperative Federalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1893, 1895 (2019); Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation
in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 113 (2018) (arguing private and public liti-
gation are different because state attorneys general, unlike non-profit groups, are often
democratically elected and therefore more accountable).
20 Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a Check on Executive Authority: State Public Litigation,
Executive Authority, and Political Polarization, 22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 305, 316 (2017).
21 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (2017).
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Act (“CAA”), because EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases threat-
ened that state’s coastal property.22
This Note clarifies the scope of the Massachusetts v. EPA Court’s
grant of special solicitude to states challenging federal administrative
policies. To clarify muddy doctrine, this Note proposes a “limiting principle”
to special state standing: courts should ask whether a state asking for
special standing solicitude claims an environmental injury.23 This Note
argues that states have benefitted from a lowered standing threshold with
little guidelines, and this lack of guidance led to an overbroad application
of Massachusetts v. EPA.24 This Note concludes that special state stand-
ing is limited to environmental injuries to states’ quasi-sovereign interests.
This limitation is supported by Supreme Court precedent, the unique
spillover effects of environmental injuries, and the policy considerations
that anthropogenic climate change requires.25
Part I of this Note outlines the ebb and flow of environmental
policy and argues that the Trump administration has moved from the
typical deregulatory strategy of “low profile” policy retrenchment to an
aggressive policy reversal approach.26 Specifically, this section summa-
rizes the history of environmental policy in the United States, and the
political “ebb and flow” of environmental policy27—and it discusses how
the Trump administration is decidedly reversing environmental laws in
the name of industry.28
Part II outlines state intergovernmental litigation as a response
to federal environmental policy making and policy retrenchment.29 This
22 Id. at 519–20 (stating “[t]hat Massachusetts does in fact own a great deal of the
‘territory to be affected’”).
23 See David M. Howard, State Parens Patriae Standing to Challenge the Federal Govern-
ment: Overruling the Mellon Bar, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1089, 1127 (2018); Grove,
supra note 2, at 855 (arguing that special state standing should be limited to cases where
states “seek to enforce or defend state law”). Discussion of states’ quasi-sovereign rights
to enforce their own laws is outside the scope of this Note.
24 See discussion infra Part III.
25 See discussion infra Part III.
26 See discussion infra Part I.
27 See id.
28 For example, in repealing the Clean Power Plan, the administration advertised the
move as removing regulatory burdens on the coal industry, when in fact other factors,
like the increasing supply of natural gas, were actually what had caused the coal in-
dustry to decline. Richard L. Revesz, Exposing the Contradictions in Trump’s Assault on
Climate Change Policy, THE HILL (Nov. 27, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-en
vironment/472245-exposing-the-contradictions-in-trumps-assault-on-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/MY37-87CD].
29 See discussion infra Part II.
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section examines the development of state-led intergovernmental litigation
and the impact of political polarization in both state coalitions and the fed-
eral government. Part II further proposes a limiting principle to special
state standing. Part III elaborates on this limiting principle that states are
entitled to special standing when protecting quasi-sovereign, environmen-
tal rights. After defining states’ quasi-sovereign rights, it argues that the
Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States misappropriated the Massachusetts
v. EPA holding. It concludes that because that court granted special
solicitude to a mere economic, non-environmental injury, it overextended
the intended scope of Massachusetts v. EPA special state standing.30
Environmentally focused state public-law litigation is different
from the other policy-influencing actions brought by state attorneys
general. In light of this difference, this Note asks whether non-environ-
mental lawsuits by state attorneys general, like in Texas, should receive
special state standing. This Note answers this question in the negative
and concludes that special state standing should be limited to intergov-
ernmental litigation where states allege environmental injuries to their
quasi-sovereign rights.31
I. TRUMP’S TRANSITION FROM “LOW PROFILE” POLICY
RETRENCHMENT TO EXPLICIT POLICY REVERSALS
Together, key environmental legislation and administrative rule-
making have created a comprehensive set of environmental laws.32 These
laws mitigate many of the collective-action problems posed by anthro-
pogenic environmental degradation.33 True to campaign promises, the
Trump administration has worked persistently to collapse the Obama
administration’s policy trademarks like the Clean Power Plan, as well as
other long-standing environmental laws.34 This initiative is a platform that
30 See discussion infra Part III.
31 See discussion infra Part III.
32 This key environmental legislation includes the National Environmental Policy Act,
the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Endangered Species Act. National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1969); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1972); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1970);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1973). For a more comprehensive list
see Laws and Executive Orders, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-ex
ecutive-orders [https://perma.cc/76AE-CTR9] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
33 Brian Palmer, Why We Need the EPA, NRDC (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/stories
/why-we-need-epa?gclid=Cj0KCQiAtOjyBRC0ARIsAIpJyGOzonuDNDlg22B_Co-nqxbiE1
HEZnTmJkwsTRZacrZ-rg8tAnJMf2saAlMkEALw_wcB [https://perma.cc/3NER-XD8B].
34 Vazquez, supra note 13.
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any Republican administration would likely implement following a two-
term Democratic administration, and vice versa.35 Some political scientists
argue that administrative changeover can appear to drastically destroy
progress in environmental policy.36 But, this appearance is not always re-
ality, and the retreat of a Republican administration often results in a mere
“green drift.”37 This green drift resulting from administrative changeover
is less drastic than retrenchment, because right-leaning administrations
have been incapable of repealing “major golden era” legislation like CAA.38
A. Historical Green Drift of the Clean Air Act
CAA,39 when enacted in 1970 under the Nixon administration, did
not initially contemplate the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions.40
Rather, the policy, enacted to further the health and safety of the Ameri-
can people, was a reaction to environmental events involving visible and
dramatic air pollution.41 During the mid-twentieth century, Congress
developed legislation in response to growing concern for the impacts of
air pollution on public health.42 After multiple attempts and revisions,
Congress passed CAA and concurrently created EPA to implement CAA’s
four major environmental regulatory programs.43 Later, in 1990, the
H.W. Bush administration enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments to
limit the sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide pollution causing acid rain.44
However, a decade later, the W. Bush administration prioritized reducing
the regulatory scope of EPA in a subtle way, by denying the legitimacy
of climate science and utilizing science to back pro-industry policies.45
35 David J. Sousa & Christopher M. Klyza, “Whither We Are Tending”: Interrogating the
Retrenchment Narrative in U.S. Environmental Policy, 132 POL. SCI. Q. 467, 468–69 (2017).
36 Id.
37 Id.; see discussion infra Section I.B.
38 Id.
39 This Note focuses specifically on CAA, a “golden era” environmental statute. While the
policy rollbacks by the Trump administration are not limited to CAA, discussion of those
policy changes and resulting litigation are outside the scope of this Note.
40 Sousa & Klyza, supra note 35, at 479.
41 See WILLIAM N. ROM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH: AIR POLLUTION,
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AND WILDERNESS 2–3 (2011).
42 See id. (discussing the development of CAA); Clean Air Act Overview: Evolution of the
Clean Air Act, EPA [hereinafter Clean Air Act Overview], https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act
-overview/evolution-clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/W65G-JQXX] (last updated Jan. 3, 2017).
43 Clean Air Act Overview, supra note 42.
44 Id.
45 Fredrickson et al., supra note 9, at S98–99.
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At the conclusion of the W. Bush administration, the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA reinforced the broad scope of CAA and held that “air
pollutants” in CAA included substances affecting the climate.46 The Court
further held that the term “welfare” in CAA includes “ ‘effects on . . .
weather . . . and climate.’”47 Following the deregulatory and science doubt-
ing approach of the Bush administration, the Obama administration
prioritized furthering the scope of environmental regulations.48 For ex-
ample, Obama joined the Paris Climate Agreement, raised fuel emissions
standards, set national emissions limits through the Clean Power Plan,
and prioritized clean energy through the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act.49
Because of the Massachusetts v. EPA Court’s holding, the Obama
administration was both required and empowered to use CAA to curb
greenhouse gas emissions.50 The effects of this holding were significant.
In 2008 and 2009, gross greenhouse gas emissions relative to the previous
year decreased by 2.8% and 6.3%, respectively, marking a drastic change
from previous years of increasing emissions.51 Before the Obama admin-
istration, gross emissions were gradually increasing by 1–2% each year.52
Since its enactment, the implementation of CAA as amended has
changed in scope and intensity depending on the presidential administra-
tive priorities.53 But, for the most part, CAA’s central objectives and regu-
latory programs have survived rollback efforts of hostile administrations.54
The Trump administration’s approach, however, presents new challenges
to the resiliency of golden era environmental laws.55
46 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506 (2007).
47 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h)).
48 A Look at Barack Obama’s Environmental Platform and Record, GRIST, https://grist
.org/article/obama_factsheet/ [https://perma.cc/F3HC-6CV3] (last updated Aug. 22, 2008).
49 Anna Aurillo & Margie Alt, Celebrating President Obama’s Environmental Legacy,
ENV’T AM. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://environmentamerica.org/news/ame/celebrating-presi
dent-obama%E2%80%99s-environmental-legacy [https://perma.cc/X6PS-P66E].
50 Sousa & Klyza, supra note 35, at 487.
51 U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, 430-P-20-001, DRAFT INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2018, ES-5 (2019), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites
/production/files/2020-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2020-main-text.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2PXQ-T345].
52 Id. at ES-7.
53 Sousa & Klyza, supra note 35, at 469.
54 Id. at 469–70.
55 Id. (explaining, however, that “any major retrenchments in the environmental field will
come through statutory change”).
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B. Trump’s Novel and Explicit Deregulatory Approach
In their 2017 article, Sousa and Klyza predict that the “green drift”
over the past forty to fifty years could shift to a “retrenchment narrative,”
where the administrative rollbacks in fact undermine golden era environ-
mental policies.56 Since 2017, the Trump administration has aggressively
pressed forward with its attempts at gutting CAA and many other en-
vironmental regimes.57 As of July 15, 2020, the administration reversed
sixty-eight environmental rules and was in the process of rolling back
thirty-two more.58 The strategy includes a “one-two punch,” where the
administration first delays the implementation of rules and then repeals
the rule completely.59
The current administration’s rollback strategy is different than
that of previous presidents.60 Historically, as enumerated by Judith Layzer
in 2012, deregulatory politicians implemented “low-profile” policies to
hamper environmental regulation by:
[a]dding riders to budget and other must-pass legislation,
changing the wording interpretation, or enforcement of ex-
isting rules; devolving greater responsibility for interpreting
and enforcing those rules to the states, regardless of their
regulatory capacity or inclination; encouraging lawsuits by
development interests, declining to appeal judicial rulings
that benefit development, or settling lawsuits on terms
favorable to industry; and downplaying, denying, or even
modifying scientific analysis when it conflicts with devel-
opment priorities.61
Those actors recognized that challenging environmental policies
directly was not effective and therefore employed these low-profile, passive
56 Id.
57 Nadja Popovich et al., 95 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environ
ment-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/CV3K-7NQJ].
58 Id.
59 Id. (noting that these rollbacks have not always been procedurally sound and that some
legal challenges have been successful); CON.RSCH.SERV.,R44615,EPA’SMETHANEREGU-
LATIONS: LEGAL OVERVIEW Summary (2018) (summarizing delays in implementation of
environmental regulations).
60 See discussion supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
61 JUDITH LAYZER, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: CONSERVATIVES’ OPPOSITION TO ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION 334 (2012).
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strategies.62 But instead of adopting subtle policy strategies and narra-
tives to push its deregulatory agenda, the Trump administration has and
continues to explicitly challenge environmental regulatory programs.63
These explicit challenges have shifted environmental policy from a green
drift to a retrenchment narrative.
C. Environmental Policy Retrenchment and Anthropogenic
Climate Change
Environmental policy retrenchment poses an existential threat to
Americans and global citizens alike.64 The rollback of controls on meth-
ane emissions and changes to automobile emissions standards, for
example, will undoubtedly increase greenhouse gas emissions above the
already unsustainable, business as usual rates.65 In October 2018, The
International Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) released an alarming
special report warning that “[g]lobal warming is likely to reach 1.5°C
between 2030 and 2052.”66 The IPCC made these projections not neces-
sarily considering the impacts of the drastic rollbacks and deregulatory
agenda of the Trump administration.67
In 2018 alone, the United States emitted around 5.429 billion
metric tons of carbon.68 The State Energy & Environmental Impact Center
of New York University Law School estimates that, by rolling back six
main regulatory programs, the administration will be forgoing a total of
2.09 million metric tons of annual CO2 emission reductions.69 This will
be a “virtual surrender” to the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of cli-
mate change and will impose additional public health costs by decreasing
air quality.70
Although 2.09 million tons seems insignificant when compared to
5.429 billion tons, the urgency of the IPCC report indicates otherwise.71
62 Id.
63 Compare LAYZER, supra note 61, with Popovich et al., supra note 57.
64 STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT, supra note 10, at 5.
65 Id. at 14, 21 (citing also the foregone health and economic benefits of rolling back EPA
clean car and methane rules).
66 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. 6 (Masson-Delmotte
et al. eds., 2018).
67 See generally id.
68 U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 51, at ES-5.
69 STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT, supra note 10, at 5.
70 Id.
71 See generally IPCC, supra note 66.
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The report maps a best-case scenario of 1.5 degree warming if global
emissions reach net-zero by 2050 and 2.0 degree warming if emissions
reach net-zero by 2070.72 The catastrophic impacts of such warming shows
that nations like the United States should be dramatically reducing its
emissions toward a net-zero goal, rather than increasing emissions.73
Perhaps a silver lining of the explicit and aggressive retrench-
ment of environmental regulations by the Trump administration is the
considerable attention and opposition it has stirred up.74 Numerous
stakeholders—youth climate activists, non-governmental organizations,
cities, counties, and state attorneys general—are protesting and chal-
lenging these proposed rules and rollbacks in the streets and in the
courts.75 Additionally, some argue that while the rhetoric of the Trump
administration has been aggressive, the actual impacts of the administra-
tion’s actions will not cause much change, because the golden era envi-
ronmental laws, as enacted by Congress in the 1970s, remain intact.76 On
the other hand, others argue that these narratives, as well as the Trump
administration’s actions, pose an existential threat to the possibility of
returning to a stable climate.77 Regardless, the Trump administration is
acting to intentionally cripple environmental regulations in one of the
most critical moments in human history.78 This approach presses the foot
on the gas as we race towards 2030, when the window for maintaining
a habitable Earth will slam shut.79
72 Id. at 16.
73 See id.
74 However, not all of the challenges to the administration have been successful and some
efforts to undermine regulations appear to be working. See Vazquez, supra note 13. On
the other hand, courts are invalidating some of EPA’s efforts to stay and reconsider rules
for lack of process. See CON. RSCH. SERV., supra note 59, at 9.
75 Scott Neuman & Bill Chappell, Young People Lead Millions To Protest Global Inaction
On Climate Change, NPR (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/20/762629200
/mass-protests-in-australia-kick-off-global-climate-strike-ahead-of-u-n-summit [https://
perma.cc/V4G9-AZKS]. Some claim that citizen environmental litigation is too insignificant
to have any real impact on federal policies. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Robert L.
Glicksman, The Limits of Citizen Environmental Litigation, 33 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RES. &
ENV’T 17 (Spring 2019), available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_en
ergy_resources/publications/natural_resources_environment/2018-19/spring/the-limits
-citizen-environmental-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/PD3N-RB46] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
76 Sousa & Klyza, supra note 35, at 471.
77 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT, supra note 10, at 5.
78 See IPCC, supra note 66, at 18.
79 Id.
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II. STATE INTERGOVERNMENTAL LITIGATION AS A RESPONSE TO
FEDERAL POLICY RETRENCHMENT
States are responding to this critical climate moment by challeng-
ing Trump’s environmental policy rollbacks in the federal courts.80 Legal
scholars debate whether public-law litigation is an appropriate use of the
federal courts.81 For example, some argue “that attorneys general are
abandoning their traditional role ‘as representatives of their states.’”82
Some believe that special state standing has gone too far, citing the
increased number of lawsuits proliferating from the Supreme Court’s
holding in Massachusetts v. EPA.83 These scholars argue that the in-
crease in lawsuits is a threat to the legitimacy of both the federal courts
and the Offices of Attorneys General.84 Because state-led litigation
“against the national government is inherently ‘political’” and the ap-
pearance of the court as a political body threatens the court’s legitimacy
and role in democracy.85
Young, however, argues that state standing has not gone too far.
He claims that the proliferation of lawsuits resulting from the Supreme
Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, is beneficial, even if political.86
He reasons that these lawsuits are no different than the actions of private
individuals, like non-profit organizations.87 Additionally, he cites that this
litigation can effectively remedy the failure of elected officials to legislate
these issues.88 Young further argues that states might actually be better
positioned than non-profit organizations to initiate these cases.89
80 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT, supra note 10, at 2; see generally
Popovich et al., supra note 57.
81 See Lemos & Young, supra note 19, at 48.
82 Id. (internal citations omitted).
83 Article III § 2 of the Constitution restricts the judicial power to “cases and contro-
versies.” Constitutional standing requires parties to meet three irreducible constitutional
requirements in order to litigate their case in federal court: injury, causation, and redress-
ability. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Constitutional
standing requirements apply to states when they are litigants; however, states can
receive “special solicitude” under the standing analysis. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497, 520 (2007).
84 See Young, supra note 19, at 1902 (describing viewpoints that the article ultimately
challenges).
85 Id. at 1894–95 (internal citations omitted).
86 See id. at 1902.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1895.
89 Id. at 1896.
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This Note refutes this argument that “hot-button” political issues
are best litigated through the federal courts merely because (1) non-
profits would do this anyway and (2) popularly elected officials are failing
to solve these issues.90 Neither of these arguments are persuasive, and
these justifications offend both long-held constitutional principles and
normative justifications.91 Practically speaking, Massachusetts v. EPA
and Texas v. United States, taken together, opened the proverbial “flood-
gates” of state-led litigation against the federal government.92 This expan-
sion poses a threat to the constitutional separation of powers.93 While
retaining the integrity of the Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA,94
the Court should clarify and narrow the scope of state standing.95 Clarifi-
cation would be particularly helpful in the context of highly politicized
and polarizing debates like immigration and health care.
A. Development of State-Led Intergovernmental Litigation
Before 2007, states challenged the federal government less fre-
quently and on a more bipartisan basis.96 For example, during the W. Bush
administration, states only acted affirmatively as initial plaintiffs or
intervenors against the federal government in three lawsuits.97 During
the Obama administration, however, states launched or participated in
sixty-eight lawsuits, winning forty, with an overall success rate of 68%.98
90 Young, supra note 19, at 1895.
91 Grove, supra note 2, at 856 (arguing that “a more expansive definition of special state
standing might threaten to erode the limits of the Article III judicial power—by enabling
every dispute between a State and the federal government to wind up in court”).
92 See discussion infra Part III.
93 See Grove, supra note 2, at 856.
94 This Note assumes that Massachusetts v. EPA was correctly decided but argues instead
that the litigation to follow incorrectly interpreted the scope of applicability of the
Massachusetts v. EPA Court’s reasoning.
95 Grove, supra note 2, at 855.
96 See Nolette, supra note 5.
97 Id. (Filter by Administration: “George W. Bush;” filter by Type of State Involvement:
“States as Initial Plaintiffs,” and “States as Intervenors”).
98 Fred Barbash, Litigation Against Executive Branch by Coalitions of States Grows in
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This shocking increase in litigation during the Obama administration,
from three to sixty-eight lawsuits, only expanded during the Trump ad-
ministration.99 Since January 2017, states have participated in 104 law-
suits against the federal government.100 For the past three years, state
challenges have far surpassed those against previous administrations.
If challenges continue at the current rate, the federal government
could face 260 multistate litigation challenges, an unprecedented num-
ber.101
These extraordinary numbers present themselves in an urgent
context. Each day the atmosphere swallows increasing amounts of green-
house gas emissions.102 Meanwhile, Trump’s agenda remains explicitly
hostile to environmental regulation.103
The dire state of the global climate compounds the destructive-
ness of this hostility, and states are responding accordingly. Columbia Law
School researchers characterize the litigatory responses to the Trump
administration’s climate-related deregulation in five categories:
1. “Defending Obama Administration Climate Policies
and Decisions” (17%),
2. “Demanding Transparency & Scientific Inquiry from
the Trump Administration” (15%),
3. “Integrating Consideration of Climate Change into
Environmental Review Permitting” (28%),
4. “Advancing or Enforcing Additional Climate Protec-
tions through the Courts” (13%), and
5. “Deregulating Climate Change, Undermining Cli-
mate Protections, or Targeting Climate Protection
Supporters” (27%).104
99 Nolette, supra note 5 (Filter by Administration: “Donald Trump;” filter by Type of State
Involvement: “State as Initial Plaintiffs,” and “State as Intervenors”) (showing 91 total
cases as of March 1, 2020).
100 Id. (Filter by Administration: “Donald Trump”).
101 Id.
102 See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 51, at S5.
103 See discussion supra Sections I.B–C.
104 DENA P. ADLER, SABIN CTR. CLIMATE CHANGE L., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN
THE AGE OF TRUMP: YEAR ONE, 29–30, 33 (2018), available at http://columbiaclimatelaw
.com/files/2018/02/Adler-2018-02-U.S.-Climate-Change-Litigation-in-the-Age-of-Trump
-Year-One.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ9Z-4E6C] (clarifying that litigation not only reacts but
also interacts with the Trump administration’s deregulatory activities).
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These lawsuits include challenges by multiple stakeholders to
numerous agencies within the administration,105 including EPA and the
President himself.106 Category (5) “Deregulating Climate Change, Under-
mining Climate Protections, or Targeting Climate Protection Support-
ers,” shows that some state parties continue to challenge Obama-era
climate policies.107 However, today, 73% of the time, state parties are suing
to challenge attempts by the Trump administration to upend climate
policy progress.108
B. State Litigation, Polarization, and the Constitution
While state litigation has increased in frequency, it has also
become increasingly polarized. Prior to 2007, intergovernmental litiga-
tion by states existed; however, many of these multistate actions were
bipartisan in nature.109 Bipartisan multistate litigation occurs when the
state plaintiffs, represented by attorneys general from both political
parties, form a coalition to sue the federal government.110 During the
Clinton administration, states sued the federal government seven times,
and six of those lawsuits were brought by “bipartisan” coalitions.111 Not
only were these lawsuits predominately bipartisan, they primarily
involved energy policy or environmental administrative challenges.112
The bipartisan and environmental nature of state-led litigation predating
Massachusetts v. EPA also occurred during the H.W. Bush administra-
tion. Under the H.W. Bush administration, five of eight lawsuits led by
states were bipartisan. Even during the Reagan administration, six of
105 Other agencies sued by states include the Federal Highway Administration, Bureau
of Land Management, Department of the Interior, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of Commerce, Food and Drug Administration, Office of
Management and Budget, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border
Patrol, Department of State, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Department of Transportation, Department of Energy. Id. at 85–106.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 33 (showing 73% of climate change litigation to be “‘pro’ cases in favor of climate-
related protections”).
109 See Nolette, supra note 5 (filter by Partisan Coalition: “Bipartisan”).
110 “Bipartisan coalitions” refers to groups of states participating in a lawsuit as joint parties
while being represented by both Republican and Democratic attorneys general. See
Nolette, supra note 5.
111 Id. (Filter by Administration: “Bill Clinton;” and filter by Partisan Coalition:
“Bipartisan”).
112 Id.
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nine state actions consisted of bipartisan coalitions, seven of which related
to environmental or energy policy enforcement.113
In addition to the polarization of state litigation, the federal gov-
ernment has been deeply polarized and gridlocked since the 1980s.114
This gridlock ensures the impossibility of any novel environmental
legislation by Congress.115 Some argue that state-led intergovernmental
litigation plays an important role in an era of polarization by enforcing
existing rules and regulations.116 Others argue, however, that these often
highly political fights should not occur in the federal courts.117 Intergov-
ernmental state litigation permits a small subset of states, now mostly
reflecting one political party, to challenge and change federal policies
affecting the entire Union.118 This litigatory power, when coupled with
special state standing, upsets the constitutional balance of both separa-
tion of powers and federalism. This combination gives litigating states
disproportionate influence over federal policies affecting non-party states.119
Instead, the other branches of the federal government, Congress and the
Courts, should lead this charge.
Today, state-led lawsuits are not bipartisan, and their scope
extends far beyond environmental disputes. The numbers alone show
that the grant of special solicitude to states has dramatically altered the
ways in which state attorneys general operate. As the then Texas Attorney
General Gregg Abbott said, “I go to the office, I sue the federal govern-
ment and I go home.”120 But is this the role that states should adopt?
113 Id. (Filter by Administration: “Ronald Reagan;” and filter by Partisan Coalition:
“Bipartisan”).
114 Sousa & Klyza, supra note 35, at 467; Drew DeSilver, The Polarized Congress of Today
Has Its Roots in the 1970s, PEWRSCH.CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarized-politics-in-congress-began-in-the-1970s-and-has-been-get
ting-worse-ever-since/ [https://perma.cc/EMT7-K65L].
115 See Sousa & Klyza, supra note 35, at 470–71.
116 Lemos & Young, supra note 19, at 49–50.
117 Grove, supra note 2, at 856.
118 Id. at 856–57.
119 See id. at 885–86.
120 Young, supra note 19, at 1893 (internal citation omitted). These lawsuits were arguably
a contributing factor to Abbott’s gubernatorial victory in 2014. Rachel Weiner, Five Things
to Know About Greg Abbott, WASH. POST (July 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/07/15/five-things-to-know-about-greg-abbott/ [https://perma.cc
/8XJL-W92Y]. Other attorneys general have received similar political recognition for their
public-law litigation against the Obama administration. See Robin Bravender, State Lawyers
Use Pruitt’s Playbook Against Him—By Suing, E&ENEWS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.ee
news.net/stories/1060059026 [https://perma.cc/H87C-W7WM] (“When Scott Pruitt was Okla-
homa’s top attorney, he made a name for himself by suing the Obama administration.”).
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Professor Tara Grove argues that while states can and should play
a role in protecting the interests and preferences of their residents, that
role should not be so broad as to allow states to influence how the executive
branch implements federal policies.121 This idea furthers Grove’s argument
that state litigation related to separation of powers is not justified.122
Rather than states, it is the role of the Congress and the Federal Courts
to fulfill this checking role.123 States should only intervene when federal-
ism concerns arise—when the federal government infringes upon state
interests.124 This argument creates a cleaner rule for standing and would
surely limit the proliferation of litigation against the Trump administra-
tion and future presidents. Grove assumes that if special state standing
is to be limited, at the very least states should receive the same treat-
ment as private parties under the doctrine of standing.125
This Note, however, argues for a slightly more specific limit to
special state standing.126 Instead of limiting special solicitude to federal-
ism concerns, states should still receive special treatment, as compared
to private parties, when they are suing to redress an environmental in-
jury affecting quasi-sovereign interests.
The Massachusetts v. EPA Court held that states have special
solicitude to protect their quasi-sovereign interests.127 While the Court
established that Massachusetts had special solicitude to protect its
quasi-sovereign interests from the threat of climate change, the Court
left many legal questions unanswered.128 For example, the Court did not
determine “to what extent and under what circumstances” states should
receive a lower standing requirement in federal court.129
Some argue that this lack of guidance regarding the scope of special
state standing gives states considerable power in the federal courts to
challenge administrative decisions.130 However, the Court challenged
some guidelines and emphasized the difference between “‘protect[ing] her
121 Grove, supra note 2, at 856.
122 Id. at 898–99.
123 See id. at 897–99.
124 Id. at 897–98.
125 Id. at 854–55.
126 See discussion infra Part III.
127 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
128 Grove, supra note 3, at 1883.
129 Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citi-
zens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L.REV. 1701,
1786 (2008).
130 See Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Essay, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking
Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1029, 1046 (2008).
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citizens from the operation of federal statutes’ . . . and allowing a State
to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do).”131 While
states cannot litigate parens patriae,132 they can bring claims against the
federal government when the state asserts its own, quasi-sovereign
right.133 Because Massachusetts was acting to protect its quasi-sovereign
interests, climate change’s effects on the state’s property, it was entitled to
special standing.134 These quasi-sovereign interests asserted under CAA
are “independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain.”135 As the Court’s holding in Massachusetts v.
EPA shows, courts should grant states special solicitude in the standing
analysis when they sue to protect an interest that is a quasi-sovereign,
environmental right “in all the earth and air within its domain.”136
III. STATES ARE ENTITLED TO SPECIAL STANDING WHEN PROTECTING
QUASI-SOVEREIGN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
Unfortunately, courts have misinterpreted and misappropriated
the Massachusetts v. EPA holding. States have weaponized the Court’s
holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, departing from precedent and disrupt-
ing the careful constitutional balance of both federalism and separation
of powers.137 Hot-button political issues should not be litigated by states
through the federal courts. And states should not have an unrestricted li-
cense to challenge federal policies that they dislike.138 Massachusetts v. EPA
held that states should only receive special treatment for the purposes of
standing when they claim injury to a quasi-sovereign right.139 However,
131 In Footnote 17 of Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court majority rejects Chief Justice Roberts’s
contention that Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, Co. is not a standing case and further re-
jects a broad reading of Massachusetts v. Mellon, prohibiting states to sue on their quasi-
sovereign rights. In Mellon, the Court specified that it was adjudicating “not rights of person
or property, not rights of dominion over physical domain, [and] not quasi-sovereign rights
actually invaded or threatened.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 n.17.
132 See Grove, supra note 3, at 1883.
133 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 520 n.17 (quoting Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237).
136 Id.
137 See Grove, supra note 2, at 895–99 (discussing state standing’s impact on federalism
and separation of powers).
138 See id. at 884 (discussing Alexander Bickel’s concern that the federal courts would
turn into a “council of revision” for states challenging federal laws) (citing Alexander M.
Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 88–90).
139 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
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this decision led to confusion and debate about the meaning and proper
application of special state standing.140
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Texas v. United States capitalized
on this confusion,141 stretching special state standing from cases with
environmental, nuisance-like injuries to purely economic injuries.142 Texas
introduced “economic injury” into the special state standing equation, a
novel injury used in the context of parens patriae.143 Historically, the
foundational state standing concept of parens patriae did not involve purely
economic injuries, especially those cases relied upon by the Massachusetts
v. EPA Court. Instead it aimed to protect interests that concern “the health
and wellbeing of residents in general.”144 Texas’s extension of Massachusetts
v. EPA departs from the Court’s environmental-specific reasoning and
has intensified the flood of highly polarized, state intergovernmental
litigation proliferating therefrom.145
This Note argues that in order to prevent states from easily chal-
lenging polarizing federal policy issues in the courts, the Court should
specify that special state standing applies exclusively in cases of environ-
mental injuries to a state’s quasi-sovereign interests. If the Court applies
this principle to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Texas, it would be reversed.146
This clarification would not only be consistent with precedent, but would
decrease the problems associated with state-led intergovernmental litiga-
tion.147 Further, while environmental issues have recently been framed
as political,148 anthropogenic climate change is an existential crisis that
140 Grove, supra note 3, at 1883.
141 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
142 See discussion infra Section III.B.
143 See discussion infra Section III.A.
144 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 485 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
145 See discussion supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court through
an equally divided Court affirmed Texas by per curiam opinion. United States v. Texas,
579 U.S. 2271, 2272 (2016). The Court has yet to explicitly state in what contexts states
have special standing. See generally Grove, supra note 3.
146 See discussion infra Section III.B.
147 See discussion supra Part II.
148 Because of disinformation campaigns like that of the Bush and Trump administrations,
the public underestimates the scientific consensus among experts. Abel Gustafson &
Matthew Goldberg, Even Americans Highly Concerned About Climate Change Dramatically
Underestimate the Scientific Consensus,YALEPROGRAMCLIMATECHANGECOMMC’N (Oct. 18,
2018), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/even-americans-highly-con
cerned-about-climate-change-dramatically-underestimate-the-scientific-consensus/
[https://perma.cc/WQ8S-X5WR]. “The partisan divide [over whether climate change should
be a priority] began in the late 1990s and has increased over time.” Elaine Kamarack,
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transcends politics.149 This is not to say that who is to pay or who is to
blame for climate change is not political, but rather that, unlike immi-
gration policy or health care, climate change impacts states differently.150
Interpreting special state standing as outlined in Massachusetts v. EPA,
to protect environmental, quasi-sovereign rights,151 serves policy goals of
limiting the flood of polarizing, state-led intergovernmental litigation
while also permitting states to stand up to the federal government when
it infringes on their quasi-sovereign environmental rights.
A. The Quasi-Sovereign Rights of States
States should be held to a lower, special standing threshold in cases
of environmental injury. “Environmental,” for the purposes of this Note, re-
fers to cases involving rights to land, air, water, climate, and well-being of
citizens, and affect the state’s quasi-sovereign interests and property
rights.152 Supreme Court precedent shows that special state standing
relies on the idea that states have quasi-sovereign rights.153 Further, these
quasi-sovereign rights, most often, if not exclusively, relate to the rights
of states to protect the environment. Environmental disputes, like over-
pollution, implicate both a state’s property and the health and well-being
of their citizens in a way that is distinct from other policy concerns.154 De-
spite this history of special state standing for environmental disputes, the
The Challenging Politics of Climate Change, BROOKINGS (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www
.brookings.edu/research/the-challenging-politics-of-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/TLP8
-K2QE]. While many agree that anthropogenic climate change exists, Democrats and
Republicans sharply diverge on the extent of the issue and how it should be addressed. Id.
149 See discussion infra Section III.B.
150 See id. Even though environmental justice concerns and climate change impacts on
individuals is beyond the scope of this Note, it is essential to mention that low income
and minority communities are and will continue to be disproportionately affected by cli-
mate change. ALEXA JAY ET AL.,U.S.GLOB.CHANGERES.PROGRAM, Overview in IMPACTS,
RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES:FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT
33, 36 (2018).
151 See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
152 See Mank, supra note 129, at 1736–37 (explaining that Massachusetts held that the
state had both a quasi-sovereign right and a property right). It is beyond the scope of this
Note to discuss the distinction between these two rights and instead treats them as under
the umbrella of quasi-sovereign rights.
153 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20.
154 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). But see Grove, supra note
2, at 865 (arguing that “Justice Holmes was using the term ‘quasi-sovereign’ in a very
different sense—to refer to the State’s sovereign interest in the continued enforceability
of state law”).
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Supreme Court did not expressly limit special solicitude to environmental
cases.155 As a result, states like Texas have weaponized special state
standing to interfere with federal policy making, challenging regulations
that do not affect a state’s environmental, quasi-sovereign rights.156
Some argue “that the State’s interest in protecting the health and
wellbeing of its citizens from transboundary nuisances is the paradigm
case of a quasi-sovereign interest that will support parens patriae stand-
ing.”157 Transboundary nuisances affecting the health and well-being of
citizens are inherently environmental, because nuisance law serves as
a key background principle for modern environmental law.158 The com-
mon law of public nuisance targets uses that negatively impact public
health and welfare, and private nuisance imposes liability for uses that
interfere with the use and enjoyment of land.159 These interests, in pro-
tecting both welfare and property, extend beyond land to other ecological
elements. For example, the Court has held that states have a quasi-
sovereign interest in fresh and coastal water ecosystems and resources.160
Overall, the Court has awarded states special treatment under Article III
standing when the states allege nuisance-like, environmental injuries.161
The special treatment states receive, however, while “judicially
created,” is construed as a narrow exception to regular standing.162 It is
a “narrow exception,” because, historically, the Court lowered the stand-
ing hurdle for state plaintiffs in particular situations.163 For example, in two
early twentieth-century nuisance cases, Missouri v. Illinois and Tennessee
Copper Co. v. Georgia, the Court did not require that the states show “di-
rect and particularized harm” to recover for the environmental nuisances
created by defendants.164 States today do not sue under nuisance doctrines
155 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
156 See discussion infra Section III.B; see generally Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134
(5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
157 Mank, supra note 129, at 1767 (quoting Thomas A. Merrill, Global Warming as a
Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 293, 304 (2005)).
158 Environmental Law 101: Governance: Overview, ENV’TL.INST., https://www.eli.org/key
words/governance [https://perma.cc/DX9R-3773] (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
159 Id.
160 Mank, supra note 129, at 1767 (identifying a number of twentieth-century Supreme
Court and state cases in which states asserted a quasi-sovereign right to water or claimed
parens patriae to protect water resources).
161 Id. at 1768.
162 Id. (citing Estado Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 2000)).
163 Id.
164 Id.; see generally Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
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present in those cases, because federal environmental regulations like
CAA have stepped in to regulate transboundary and national environ-
mental issues.165 However, these holdings, which the Court relied upon
in Massachusetts v. EPA,166 show that states should receive special stand-
ing when litigating environmental injuries to quasi-sovereign interests.
The Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon held that states could not
bring citizen’s interests to court as parens patriae.167 However, the Mellon
Court also found that Massachusetts could have established standing by
asserting its own justiciable rights.168 But Massachusetts failed to do so,
and the Court denied standing to Massachusetts suing in its capacity as
a sovereign.169
That case did not concern environmental harm or a public nui-
sance. Instead, in Mellon, Massachusetts sued on behalf of tax payers.170
The Court denied standing to the state as a sovereign and reasoned that
Massachusetts did not allege a “direct and immediate” injury.171 The
Court’s decision to avoid a more permissible standing test in Mellon shows
how environmental and economic harms are distinguishable.172 In Ten-
nessee Copper Co., Missouri, and Mellon, citizens were adversely affected
by taxes and pollution; however, the Court chose to grant standing only
to remedy the environmental harms—those harms implicating the states’
proprietary interests.173 Because the environmental harm implicated the
quasi-sovereign interests of the states, the Court granted standing in
Tennessee Copper Co. and Missouri.174 Meanwhile in Mellon, the Court
held that the state did not allege standing on its own, because it “did not
have an interest in the subject matter” of the suit.175
165 ENV’T L. INST., supra note 158.
166 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 n.17 (2007).
167 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).
168 Id. at 484–85 (“rights of dominion over physical domain, . . . quasi sovereign rights
actually invaded or threatened, [and] abstract questions of political power, of sovereignty,
of government”).
169 See id. at 480 (holding “the state of Massachusetts presents no justiciable controversy
either in its own behalf or as the representative of its citizens”).
170 Id. at 486.
171 See id. at 485.
172 See id. at 480.
173 Compare Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480, with Missouri, 180 U.S. at 248 and Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. at 239.
174 See Missouri, 180 U.S. at 208; Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237.
175 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 480; Grove, supra note 2, at 872 (“Indeed, Massachusetts v. Mellon
assumed the validity of the ‘quasi-sovereign’ standing theory in Missouri v. Holland.”).
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When states sue to enforce their quasi-sovereign, environmental
rights, they are asserting their right to protect their own interests, either
under the common law or by statute.176 States lost their independent
sovereignty when they ratified the Constitution; however, the states re-
tained some interests, which are preserved through the delicate balance
of federalism.177 These remaining interests, like their property, are “quasi-
sovereign interests.”178 Ensuring the integrity of the ecosystems within
that state’s property has positive spillover effects on citizens’ health and
well-being. Therefore, when states protect their own property from en-
vironmental nuisances, they simultaneously guard the well-being of their
citizens. Even though the states are not suing as parens patriae, assert-
ing the rights of citizens, by asserting their own rights, states in turn
guard the general welfare of their residents.
As held in Mellon, states cannot sue as parens patriae on behalf
of individual residents.179 In environmental cases, however, states can
sue not as a parent but as an individual state, protecting its own interests.
Even though the states are suing on their own behalf, to protect their
water, air, and land from environmental harm, these lawsuits create posi-
tive externalities which simultaneously protect their own residents’ health
and well-being.
B. Texas Failed to Allege a Quasi-Sovereign Right
The Court’s failure to define the scope of special state standing
permitted lower courts to expand Massachusetts v. EPA’s applicability.180
In Texas v. United States, state plaintiffs challenged the Obama adminis-
tration’s Deferred Action for Parental Arrivals (“DAPA”) program, which
aimed to transition immigrants without legal status to legal residents.181
In that case, the Fifth Circuit engaged in a standing analysis which pur-
ported to compare the case to that of Massachusetts v. EPA.182 That court
reasoned that Texas merited special standing because Texas would have
176 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007).
177 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
178 Mank, supra note 129, at 1729 (stating that the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA
“implied that the federal government owes states greater standing rights because states
have surrendered sovereign powers to the federal government”).
179 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485.
180 See generally Grove, supra note 2 (discussing the undefined scope of state standing).
181 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146–48 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
182 Id. at 151–55.
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to change its laws and incur costs to issue approximately 500,000 drivers’
licenses to accommodate the newly documented DAPA parents.183 The
court also asserted in a conclusory manner that because “states are not
normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction” and
Texas was similar enough to Massachusetts, Texas had standing.184
With its questionable reasoning, the Fifth Circuit in Texas broad-
ened the scope and applicability of special state standing.185 The alleged
injury of issuing drivers’ licenses did not concern the quasi-sovereign
rights of the state of Texas, so Texas’s challenge to DAPA did not impact its
land, air, water, or the welfare of its citizens. Therefore, Texas did not im-
plicate any quasi-sovereign rights, and the injury claimed by the state was
purely economic.186 The court nevertheless held that the state had special
standing, such that it could interfere with the federal executive’s actions.187
This abuse of special state standing in Texas is problematic because it
departs from precedent, it has encouraged a flood of partisan, state-led
litigation, and it violates the delicate balance of separation of powers.
C. Proposed Limited Principle: Special Standing for Environmental
Injuries to Quasi-Sovereign Interests
To avoid the negative effects of a broad special state standing
doctrine, the Court should clarify that its holding in Massachusetts v.
EPA intended to grant special standing to states in cases alleging envi-
ronmental injuries to quasi-sovereign interests. This limitation to state
standing would be justified because environmental injuries, especially in
the context of climate change, are different than pure economic injuries.
Health care and immigration policy have dramatic humanitarian
impacts on national and international scales. However, these issues are
governed by the health of the global climate system. Therefore, the sever-
ity of health care and immigration issues are not independent of, but
rather are dependent upon our changing climate.188 For this reason, the
183 Id. at 155; see also Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 805 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
184 Texas, 809 F.3d at 152–55.
185 See discussion supra Part II.
186 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923).
187 Texas, 809 F.3d at 152–55.
188 STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL PREPARE TO FIGHT, supra note 10, at 3–6, 38–39 (discuss-
ing how rollback of environmental rules will impact public health); John Podesta, The
Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees, BROOKINGS (July 25, 2019), https://www.brook
ings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/9HPZ-UPEG].
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concern raised in Massachusetts v. EPA for regulating carbon emissions
is fundamentally different than Texas’s distaste for DAPA.
Further, the science behind environmental injuries like climate
change is sound.189 In addition to the overwhelming scientific consensus,
the Massachusetts v. EPA Court endorsed and the “EPA [did] not dispute
the causal connection between manmade greenhouse gas emission and
global warming.”190 This concrete science further distinguishes environ-
mental injuries from the injury alleged in Texas. For example, if the
federal government decreases its enforcement of immigration laws, this
change will impact states with significant migrant populations like Texas
and Arizona.191 But the question of whether this impact is actually “harm-
ful” or causing an “injury” is purely a political and economic question.192
However, if the federal government decreases enforcement of emissions
standards under CAA, all states will undoubtedly be harmed by decreased
air quality and increased risk of climate change related impacts.193
Unlike the perceived “harm” of decreasing immigration enforce-
ment, the harm of decreasing environmental regulation is backed by
decades of climate science.194 The scientific backing of environmental
injuries will prevent state attorneys general from creating ad hoc “inju-
ries” to further their xenophobic and partisan agendas to enjoin federal
policies with which they disagree.195 Therefore, unlike Texas’s fabricated
injury in Texas v. United States,196 states alleging environmental injuries
to their land, air, water, and the welfare of their citizens—or quasi-
sovereign rights—deserve special standing.
189 See discussion supra Part I.
190 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007).
191 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
192 Plaintiffs in Texas alleged that DAPA would cost the state “several million dollars” to
issue drivers’ licenses to the estimated 500,000 undocumented people in the state. Id. But
see Lizet Ocampo, The Economic Benefits and Electoral Implications of DAPA, CTR. AM.
PROGRESS (May 19, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news
/2015/05/19/113481/the-economic-benefits-and-electoral-implications-of-dapa/ [https://
perma.cc/GV8F-5XMB] (estimating that DAPA would create thousands of jobs and increase
gross domestic product by $164 billion and the cumulative income of all Americans by $88
billion over ten years).
193 See discussion, supra Part I.
194 See id.
195 See Weiner, supra note 120. Opposition to immigrants regardless of legal status, on
the other hand, is increasingly based in xenophobia rather than actual data and facts.
196 But see Texas, 809 F.3d at 159 (holding that Texas’s injury was not self-inflicted to manu-
facture standing because the driver’s license law was in effect three years prior to DAPA).
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CONCLUSION
Because of the history and precedent of state standing, states
should, at the very least, have special standing to protect their quasi-
sovereign interests. These quasi-sovereign interests, however, are not
unlimited, and states should not be authorized to claim any interest to
justify state standing. Rather, states should be given special state standing,
as declared in Massachusetts v. EPA, in cases where the state alleges an
environmental injury to a quasi-sovereign right. An environmental injury
is an injury that affects the state’s land, air, water, and citizen welfare.
This proposed limiting principle for standing is not drastically restrictive
and does not disrupt the Court’s standing decisions. However, it would
likely yield a different result in cases like Texas v. United States, a highly
political state-led lawsuit based on a diminutive economic injury.
From a policy perspective, this interpretation of Massachusetts v.
EPA could decrease the inundation of the federal courts with politically
charged challenges focused merely on enjoining an unpopular federal
policy. Further, this principle would allow states to ensure that the federal
government upholds its duties to protect the life and liberty of Americans
and their posterity from a deadly, unstable climate system.
